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Abstract 
There is consensus that physicians, health professionals and health
care organizations should discuss harm that results from health care
delivery (adverse events), including the reasons for harm, with
patients and their families. Thought leaders and policy makers in the
USA and Canada support this goal. However, there are gaps in both
countries between patients and physicians in their attitudes about
how errors should be handled, and between disclosure policies and
their implementation in practice. This paper reviews the state of dis-
closure policy and practice in the two countries, and the barriers to full
disclosure. Important barriers include fear of consequences, attitudes
about disclosure, lack of skill and role models, and lack of peer and
institutional support. The paper also describes the problem of the sec-
ond victim, a corollary of disclosure whereby health care workers are
also traumatized by the same events that harm patients. The presence
of multiple practical and personal barriers to disclosure suggests the
need for a comprehensive solution directed at multiple levels of the
health care system, including health departments, institutions, local
managers, professional staff, patients and families, and including
legal, health system and local institutional support. At the local level,
implementation could be based on a translating-evidence-into-practice
framework. Applying this framework would involve the formation of
teams, training, measurement and identification of local barriers to
achieving universal disclosure of adverse events. 
Introduction
Patients deserve to know the reasons for unexpected clinical out-
comes. Although an undesired outcome may represent the progression
of disease, sometimes care is at fault. Harm from health care delivery
may unfortunately occur despite the best of care. Such harm results
most frequently from a recognized complication − an inherent risk of
an investigation or treatment. For example, a patient with no previous-
ly known allergy to penicillin may suffer anaphylaxis from the drug.
Harm may also result from failures in the structure and process of
care, including issues in individual provider performance. The patient
with a known allergy to penicillin reacting to the drug given by mistake
would fall into this category. Various terms have been used to describe
clinical events involving unintended harm from health care delivery. In
this paper, we use the term adverse event to refer to patient harm
caused by the care provided. We also use the term preventable adverse
event, which is synonymous with harmful error.1,2
Disclosure to patients of harm from healthcare delivery is intrinsic
to maintaining the trust between patients and healthcare profession-
als. Disclosure is used to refer to the process by which an adverse event
is communicated to the patient. Much of this paper focuses on commu-
nication of adverse events to patients in which human error was
involved. Some, particularly in the United States, would link disclosure
to early offers of compensation and restitution, but this is not uniform
within the United States or Canada. 
The purpose of this paper is to review what is known about adverse
event disclosure policies and practice in the US and Canada, and to
recommend steps to narrow the gaps between i) policy and practice
and ii) physicians and health care organizations, and patients. 
The 1999 report from the Institute of Medicine provided the first
estimates of harm due to health care, estimating that as many as
98,000 patients a year in the US die related to adverse events.3 More
recent estimates still remain in the 100,000 lives per year range.
Autopsy studies of ICU patients have revealed up to 30% rate of unsus-
pected findings that would have changed treatment and improved out-
come.4 An early study at a large teaching hospital found 3.13 medica-
tion errors per 1000 orders;5 more recent studies of adverse drug
events in the ambulatory setting revealed a rate of 13.8 preventable
adverse drug events per 1000 person-years.6-10 According to the Joint
Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare, wrong site surgery
occurs as often as 40 times per week in the US. In the past 15 years,
there has been a steady increase in awareness of patient safety prob-
lems, and increased recognition of the obligation of health care work-
ers and health care organizations to inform patients about adverse
events. However, there are disturbing gaps between patients and
physicians in their attitudes about the communication of adverse
Significance for public health
It is inevitable that some patients will be harmed rather than helped by
health care. There is consensus that patients and their families must be told
about these harmful events. However, there are gaps between patient and
physician attitudes about how errors should be handled, and between disclo-
sure policies and their implementation. There are important barriers that
impede disclosure, including fear of consequences, attitudes about disclo-
sure, lack of skill, and lack of institutional support. A related problem is that
of the second victim, whereby health care workers are traumatized by the
same harmful events. This can impair their performance and further com-
promise safety. The problem is unlikely to be solved by focusing solely on
increasing disclosure. A comprehensive solution is needed, directed at mul-
tiple levels of the health care system, including health departments, institu-
tions, local managers, professional staff, patients and families, and includ-
ing legal, health system and local institutional support. 
Review
no
n c
mm
erc
ial
 us
e o
nly
events, and between disclosure policies and their implementation in
practice. 
Perhaps the most appropriate place to start is to ask: what do
patients want and need? There has been an increase in recognition of
the importance of patients’ perspectives on medical care, and a con-
comitant growth in research into patients’ views on medical errors and
disclosure. Several studies suggest that patients are aware that safety
is an issue in health care,11-13 and a surprisingly high percentage of the
general population, (including physicians who might be considered
competent to assess care) believe that they or a loved one has experi-
enced a medical error.11,14 In one study of 11 countries, 11.2% of
patients reported error.15 However, patients tend to define error more
broadly than health care professionals. The patient definition may
include communication problems, disrespect, lack of caring or compas-
sion, and non-preventable adverse events as well as medical errors.16,17
Almost all patients would want to be told if an adverse event occurred
in their care.14 However, as noted above, patients believe that physi-
cians often don’t tell patients when an adverse event has occurred. In
addition, patients sometimes suspect an error has occurred in their
care, but don’t report these suspicions.17
Patients who have suffered adverse events report a range of reac-
tions.12,18 Many feel frustrated, angry, anxious, depressed, or over-
whelmed. Patients and family members may both feel guilt after an
error, believing that there was something they could have done to pre-
vent the error. Often the relationship with the provider is damaged, and
trust is lost. Sometimes the relationship can be repaired, but in other
cases the patient may change providers. A less frequent response, but
a concerning one, is avoidance of healthcare providers in general.
Conversely, some patients and family members report becoming more
engaged and activated, seeking second opinions, researching their
health conditions, asking more questions, and being more assertive in
their interactions with their providers. 
While health care workers tend to focus predominantly on the health
outcomes and emotional consequences of an adverse event, such inci-
dents may also have significant effects on other aspects of patients’
lives, such as school, work, family commitments and relationships.
Additionally, adverse events often have financial consequences for
patients and families, resulting for instance in co-payments for addi-
tional visits, lost wages, and costs of childcare. Obviously, when an
adverse event results in a long-term disability or death, the costs can be
overwhelming. 
Studies of patients’ preferences for communication about adverse
events fall into two major categories: studies of patients’ reactions to
hypothetical situations, and studies of patients’ actual experiences
with care. Findings from studies of patients’ reactions to hypothetical
situations have concluded that whether and how a physician discloses
an event affects how patients respond. For example, Mazor and col-
leagues randomly assigned patients to one of eight versions of a ques-
tionnaire which described an error and a physician-patient conversa-
tion about the error.14 The versions varied in terms of the error, the
associated harm, and the level of disclosure. Full disclosure (wherein
the hypothetical physician took responsibility for what had occurred,
explained how the error had occurred, expressed regret, and conveyed
a commitment to preventing recurrences) resulted in a more positive
emotional response, greater satisfaction with the physician’s commu-
nication, greater trust, and lower likelihood of changing physicians.
However, in these hypothetical situations, there was not a consistent
effect on intent to seek legal advice; this intent was instead predicted
by the nature of the error and the level of harm.14 Other studies yield-
ed similar conclusions:12,19,20 full disclosure generally leads to a more
positive patient response, but certain patient reactions (such as intent
to seek legal advice) may be more affected by the event and the harm
than by the level of disclosure. 
Studies of patients’ actual experiences with disclosure of adverse
events provide important insights that significantly extend the find-
ings of these earlier studies, and also help to define what patients
want after an event has occurred.17,18,21,22 First, patient interviews
confirm that disclosure often does not occur. Second, nondisclosure
does not prevent patients from suspecting that an error occurred.
Patients – especially dissatisfied patients or patients in distress –
may seek care elsewhere, obtain a second opinion, or seek advice
from friends or family members who have medical expertise. In
these ways and others, patients may obtain information that increas-
es their suspicion. Third, patients who believe that they suffered
from errors in care do not always voice their beliefs. Instead, they
may suffer in silence which may prevent clinicians from correcting
misperceptions, from mitigating harm or acting to prevent recur-
rence. Finally, this line of research has reinforced our understanding
of the key elements of disclosure and how these affect how patients’
respond.18,21-23 The key elements are an explanation of the event,
acknowledgement of responsibility as appropriate, sincere regret
and apology, appreciation of how the event affected the patient and
family, commitment to preventing recurrences, and evidence that
learning occurred. The relative importance of each of these elements
is likely to vary depending on the details of the event, its impact and
the context. What is an ideal disclosure conversation in one situa-
tion may fall short in another. The elements of disclosure are dis-
cussed in further detail below.Explanation
When patients believe something has gone wrong in their care, they
want information. This typically includes an explanation of what hap-
pened, including how and why the event or error occurred. While
patients understand that clinicians are human and make mistakes,
they also trust that those providers they go to for care will do their best.
When things go wrong, they want to know what happened. Acknowledgement of responsibility
Patients respond positively when clinicians acknowledge that some-
thing has gone wrong, and assume appropriate responsibility. Clinicians
who act in a defensive manner and attempt to minimize what has
occurred are likely to be seen as trying to protect themselves from law-
suits. Such actions are unlikely to be protective, and are much more like-
ly to further damage the relationship rather than help restore it. Expression of sincere regret: apology
Patients respond positively to expressions of regret and apology, but
only if these are perceived to be sincere. When a patient perceives that
those involved are distressed by the event, he or she is more likely to
accept the apology as sincere. Similarly, if a clinician actively and obvi-
ously seeks to rectify what has gone wrong, this is also likely to be con-
sidered evidence of caring. However, in the absence of an emotional
response on the part of the clinician, the patient may perceive a spoken
apology as empty, and the words I’m sorry may not be sufficient to
restore trust.22
Sensitivity to the potentially broad-ranging effects of adverse events
(including the emotional impact and life disruptions as well as the
health effects) and expressions of empathy for the importance of these
to the patient and family, can also help to convey caring, maintain trust
and a strong provider-patient relationship. Commitment to preventing recurrences
A cornerstone of the patient safety movement is the commitment to
learning from adverse events and near-misses.3,24 Interestingly,
patients and family members see the prevention of recurrences as top
priority as well. Patients who suffer as the result of an adverse event
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resulting from errors overwhelmingly endorse the need to make sure
that others do not suffer similarly. For clinicians and safety officers,
such efforts may involve root cause analyses, discussions such as mor-
bidity and mortality conferences, or other established procedures.25
Patients are typically not aware of the details of such efforts, nor are
they typically involved (though when harm is serious, such details may
be important to family members).26 But virtually all patients and fami-
ly members want to know that the healthcare team is working to pre-
vent recurrences. To patients, an important element of preventing
recurrences is that those involved learned from the event. Thus,
patients may expect both individual and system level efforts to improve
the processes of care. Financial reparations and legal action
Do compensation programs decrease litigation and improve disclo-
sure of adverse events? Rick Boothman and colleagues at the
University of Michigan instituted an open disclosure policy and early
resolution program, with a subsequent decrease in claims from three
million dollars to one million dollars.27 COPIC, the medical liability
company of Colorado, has the most recognized private sector program,
the 3Rs program.28 This program, since its inception, has provided over
3000 patients an average payment of $5400. This program encourages
honest discussion between the physician and patient about the event
that occurred. Both of these suggest that compensation may make dis-
closure less adversarial. In addition the low amount of payments in the
COPIC data suggests that it is not always about a large amount of com-
pensation. 
While fear of litigation, reputational and financial loss are often
cited as barriers to full disclosure at the clinician and organizational
level, interviews with patients who believe that they have been harmed
by clinician errors reveal that very few consider legal action even in the
face of what they perceive to be significant harm.17,18,21,22,29
What do health professionals, especially physicians, believe should
be done after an adverse event, and what do they want and need?
Physicians are aware that the practice of medicine is fraught with
peril, and worry about errors that may harm patients. They feel threat-
ened by the possibility of being involved in a harmful event and result-
ant litigation. Thus, they are conflicted about how to handle such
events. They think they should disclose most adverse events including
errors, but have limited experience around disclosure and are not con-
fident about their ability to have such discussions. They are also
unsure if their colleagues will be supportive.12 They do tend to believe
that deception is acceptable in some circumstances.30 They are often
unaware of both policy and legal protections that are already in place
regarding disclosure. 
There is evidence of self-protective behaviour among physicians,
who want to describe events in the most positive way possible.31,32 It
appears that partial disclosure is common, which includes describing
the event but not that it caused harm, implying that harm was caused
by disease rather than care, describing the bad outcome but not the
event, and not accepting appropriate responsibility or giving an apolo-
gy. Paradoxically, they may take on responsibility for unavoidable out-
comes or failures in the processes of care beyond their control.
Physicians hope that in the case of an adverse event, especially
those related to error, they will get support from their colleagues and
institutions. They would like support in carrying out disclosure discus-
sions. Ideally, they would like understanding and forgiveness by
patients. They want discussions to be kept as confidential as possible,
but would also like changes to be made the delivery system to help pre-
vent recurrences. 
Disclosure in the USAThe problem
To Err is Human was the seminal report from the Institute of
Medicine in 1999 that drew attention to the problem of medical errors
and how physicians dealt with them.3 Prior to this time errors were hid-
den and often covered up.33 Paternalism prevailed and a defensive pos-
ture was common. There is now a consensus among medical organiza-
tions, ethicists and physicians that we should disclose all adverse
events, including those resulting from error.34 The American Medical
Association Code of Medical Ethics states that a physician must report
an accident, injury or bad result stemming from his or her treatment; the
American College of Physicians has a similar statement.35,36 Despite
the universal endorsement of disclosing adverse events, studies still
suggest disclosure of errors is not ubiquitous, occurring in only approx-
imately 30% of cases.11,12,30,37,38Attitudes toward disclosure
Recent articles have looked at the attitude of physicians-in-training
toward disclosing errors. White et al.39 surveyed more than 1100
trainees, over 99% of whom agreed that disclosure should occur.
However, only 34% had disclosed a serious error and only 33% had
received training in disclosure. Barriers to disclosure included think-
ing the patient would not want to know about the error, would not
understand the error, and fear of litigation. Varjavand et al.40 surveyed
first year residents 9 years apart. They used two hypothetical scenarios
that described one error with an adverse outcome and one without. In
1999-2000 29% would disclose an adverse outcome case and 38% would
disclose on no harm cases. By 2008-2009 these numbers rose to 55%
and 71%. Not surprisingly the biggest barrier was fear of litigation. A
2013 survey of 1891 physicians found that only two thirds completely
agreed with disclosing serious medical errors to the patient and almost
one fifth did not completely agree that doctors should never tell a
patient something untrue.30 A total of 20% admitted they had not fully
disclosed an error because of fear of litigation. Taken together, these
and other studies suggest that physicians do not routinely disclose
errors when they occur.The biggest hurdle: fear 
The literature is clear that there is still a gap between recommenda-
tions about disclosure of adverse events including errors and actual
practice. There are many barriers to disclosure, with fear, and especial-
ly the fear of litigation, being one of the most prominent.41
Embarrassment and distress after adverse events are other frequently
mentioned reasons,12 as are fear of reporting requirements to the
National Practitioner Databank and fear of loss of license. There is also
the possibility that disclosure will destroy the patients’ faith in the
physician and the medical system in general, leading to avoidance of
needed beneficial care. 
In the litigious culture of the US there are incentives to bring suit, the
most important being the chance of a large settlement. This presents a
large hurdle to any clinician who might put themselves in harms way by
disclosing an error. But is there a relationship between disclosure and
litigation? This is controversial. It is certain that absence of disclosure
may drive litigation in an effort to find out what happened,42 and studies
suggest that when disclosure is made, awards might be lower.43 However,
there are also cases in which litigation occurs subsequent to the revela-
tion of an unsuspected error.44 There are a variety of disclosure and res-
olution programs in the United States that extend compensation to
injured parties and families. In an interesting article, Murtaugh and col-
leagues surveyed lay people about their views on medical injuries, disclo-
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sure and apology.45 Respondents indicated they would appreciate full
compensation offers after injury but this would not decrease their likeli-
hood of seeking legal advice. Full compensation offers actually increased
the likelihood that the disclosure and offer would be perceived as an
effort to avoid litigation. 
Over two thirds of the states have disclosure or apology laws. The
majority protect the providers’ expression of sympathy from use in a
patient’s lawsuit. However, there has been criticism of these laws.46
Critics suggest that these laws have structural weaknesses that actually
discourage comprehensive apologies. These authors suggest that a more
thorough or umbrella-like protection would stimulate more full disclosure
and improve error communication. 
Disclosure of harm in Canada 
It is now recognized in Canada that improving patient safety is a pri-
ority. As a result of adverse events, it is estimated 8-24,000 adults are
injured yearly in Canadian hospitals.47 Paediatric patients are also at
risk.48 The Canadian Patient Safety Institute (CPSI) confirmed even
higher rates of safety problems in home care in a review published in
2013.49
The CPSI, in an effort to standardize terminology with others across
the world, promotes the use of the Patient Safety Incident terminology
and definitions used in the International Classification of Patient
Safety (ICPS) from the World Health Organization (WHO).
However the term adverse event is still used widely in Canada with
the broad meaning of referring to harm from health care delivery. Harm
therefore includes that resulting from the recognized inherent risks of
investigations and treatments, from failures in the systems and
processes of care and from provider performance and error. The
provinces and territories may use different terms in their laws. 
Disclosure of adverse events is considered an ethical and profession-
al obligation of health professionals in Canada. For example, all of the
provincial medical regulatory licensing authorities (Colleges), even
those without formal policies, would expect disclosure. Although specif-
ic legislation may not exist in every jurisdiction, disclosure may be
seen as a legal duty in all of the provinces and territories. 
Accreditation Canada, the body that accredits and supports organiza-
tions in examining and improving the quality of care they provide to
their patients, includes in its program of Required Organizational
Practices that organizations must have a policy, including process and
training, for disclosure of adverse events. The policy must include sup-
port mechanisms for patients, family, and care or service providers. 
The CPSI brought together patient representatives and many profes-
sional healthcare groups from across Canada to develop the Canadian
Disclosure Guidelines, published in 2008 with a further revision in
2011.50 These Guidelines are widely used in all of the Canadian
provinces and territories to develop policy and approaches to disclo-
sure. The Guidelines emphasize the importance of building a just cul-
ture in healthcare organizations to facilitate reporting and correction
of vulnerabilities before patient harm occurs.51 Such a workplace cul-
ture emphasizes appropriate professional accountability. However,
providers would not be held responsible for system failures over which
they have little or no control. 
The Canadian Medical Protective Association (CMPA), the not-for-
profit mutual defence association which has almost all Canadian physi-
cians as members, published a companion booklet Communicating
with your Patient about Harm: Disclosure of Adverse Events.52 This
guide provides practical suggestions on how to meet the clinical, infor-
mation, and emotional needs of patients and families who have expe-
rienced unexpected clinical outcomes. Early disclosure and on-going
discussions are suggested, including advice on who should be involved,
apology, and a summary checklist of the important steps. 
The prevalence and impact of disclosure in Canada is not known.
There is little formal research about the impact of the Canadian
Disclosure Guidelines on disclosure. Most healthcare institutions would
likely anecdotally report they have made progress in reporting and dis-
closing adverse events to patients over the last several years. Calls to
the CMPA from physicians for advice about disclosure have increased.
The creation of a just culture and how to approach disclosure is now
embedded in many Canadian patient safety education programs. Based
on accreditation requirements, disclosure training in hospitals is rela-
tively widespread, but generally less so in community practices.
Although other training programs exist, the CMPA provides much of
the training to physicians. 
The Safety Competencies outline the expectations for training of
health professionals in patient safety, including disclosure.53
Disclosure training is increasingly taught in medical schools and resi-
dency training. The existing CanMEDS framework used to guide physi-
cian training in Canada are currently being revised to explicitly incor-
porate The Safety Competencies and will be published in 2015.
Apology legislation is in place in 8 of 10 provinces and 2 of 3 territo-
ries. The legislation protects an apology from being used in civil litiga-
tion and, depending on the wording, in some other investigative
forums. It typically provides that an apology does not constitute an
admission of fault or liability. This legislative protection has not been
challenged in court to date. Early offers of compensation are generally
not linked to disclosure in Canada, as negligence has not been proven.
The Canadian courts have the responsibility to make such determina-
tions.
There is increasing recognition that providers involved in adverse
events may also have clinical, emotional, and information needs. The
CMPA publishes advice on coping in the CMPA Good Practices Guide. 
The second victim 
The problem of the second victim is a close corollary of disclosure. A
second victim is a health care provider involved in an adverse event and
who is also traumatized.54 Some providers may find a disclosure discus-
sion healing but others may suffer after a disclosure discussion and an
error. The initial reaction is consistent with acute stress disorder, with
shock, anxiety, depressive symptoms, social withdrawal and agitation,
compounded by feelings of shame, guilt and self-doubt.55 Although
these symptoms typically last for days to weeks, a few individuals go on
to have symptoms similar to those of post traumatic stress disorder,
including flashbacks, avoidance of associated situations, and sleep dis-
turbance. Health care workers can be impaired by both short and long
terms symptoms.56-59 Some leave their professions altogether, and a
few even commit suicide.60
Psychological trauma can be induced by multiple factors, beginning
with the event itself.61,62 The responses of peers, which can be critical
or otherwise hurtful, can add to the trauma.63,64 The subsequent inves-
tigation can re-open old wounds, particularly if conducted in an insen-
sitive manner.61 Scott describes enduring the inquisition as an expect-
ed stage in the second victim’s reaction.65 Finally, malpractice litigation
is well known to be traumatic for all parties involved.66
The prevalence estimates of second victims range from 10-
50%.63,65,67,68 Requiring disclosure of adverse events to patients, in
turn, requires the disclosing health care workers to confront and accept
responsibility for their own errors which may permit absolution but
increase distress.69,70 Awareness and consideration of the problem of
second victims, and supporting clinicians after adverse events is a nec-
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essary component of systematic and comprehensive approach to han-
dling adverse events.71
Proposed solutions
This discussion demonstrates the need to address the gaps between
patient and professional attitudes, and between disclosure policy and
actual practice. Delivering health care is an inherently risky enterprise.
A number of approaches have been suggested including comprehensive
risk mitigation.72,73
Even when errors are conceptualized as attributable to system-level
faults or breakdowns, the responsibility for recognizing and disclosing
errors falls to individuals. In spite of the prevalence of policies support-
ing disclosure and transparency when errors occur, individual
providers continue to face substantial barriers to conducting effective
disclosure conversations. These include: i) fear of the financial and
legal consequences of disclosure. So long as care providers worry about
this, they can be expected to be guarded about their role in adverse
events, and the perceived risks of disclosure. ii) Loss of face and emo-
tional distress; becoming the second victim of an event. iii) Attitudes,
including the belief that disclosure is not necessary or appropriate;
sometimes coupled with the belief that disclosure would not benefit the
patient. iv) Skill deficits, including lack of training or practice in effec-
tive disclosure. v) Limited role modelling of disclosure during medical
school, residency, and practice and the consequent perception that dis-
closure is not the norm. vi) Lack of an institutional culture and norms
supporting disclosure, (a just culture of patient safety) manifesting as
lack of support from colleagues and tacit acceptance of nondisclosure.
The presence of these multiple barriers suggests that a comprehen-
sive solution, directed at multiple levels of the healthcare system is
needed (Figure 1). While providers may find themselves alone with the
patient and family members as they disclose a medical error, they need
support from all levels of the healthcare system to have the conversa-
tions consistently and effectively. 
Policy solutions are a key ingredient in supporting and increasing
disclosure. To be most effective, policies should include detailed guid-
ance and instructions for providers related to disclosure of adverse
events, such as those created by the CMPA at a state or national level.52
Although national guidance is not available in the US, several influen-
tial groups have published and disseminated detailed recommenda-
tions.73-77 While critical, national policies are unlikely to be sufficient.
Local policies, based in part on these guidelines, need to reiterate the
importance of disclosure, and customize guidance and expectations to
the specific institutional context. These policies in turn provide the
foundation for educational and training efforts. At the national level,
training in the communication skills needed for effective disclosure
should be incorporated into medical school, residency and all health
care professional education, and preceptors need to model these skills.
At the local practice level, continuing efforts are required both to con-
vey the message that disclosure is expected and supported, and to pro-
vide opportunities to refresh and practice disclosure skills. Such
refresher training is needed because most providers will have few dis-
closure conversations over the course of their careers. For this reason,
additional support, such just-in-time in-person coaching (e.g., from on-
call Risk Managers or other specially trained staff) or on-line support of
disclosure (e.g., giving standard operating procedures and pointers)
should be offered to providers to help them prepare for these infrequent
conversations. Finally, patients should be engaged, by being informed
about institutional policies and the expectation of openness after
adverse events. 
While policy and educational efforts are necessary to increasing the
prevalence and effectiveness of disclosure, the continuing gap between
policy recommendations and actual practice makes clear that existing
policies are not being implemented. It is our belief that the most
intractable barriers are emotional, cultural and attitudinal. Providers
continue to fear the consequences of disclosure. Cultural norms –
beginning with the hidden curriculum that communicates a norm of
guardedness and self-protection in medical school and residency, con-
tinuing into practice – militate against disclosure. These attitudes
together continue to reinforce attitudes that disclosure is both danger-
ous and unnecessary. What additional changes are needed to improve
the health care cultural norms around handling harm from health care
delivery, and the personal handling of failure and medical errors? 
We believe that the translating-evidence-into-practice (TRIP) frame-
work may provide useful insights.78 This approach begins with envi-
sioning the problem on the system level, and engaging local interdisci-
plinary teams to carry out the improvements needed. We believe that
engagement of local teams is the necessary first step in changing local
culture and norms. These local teams would begin by summarizing the
evidence on best practices relating to handling adverse events and
error. They would then review and examine these best practices in
order to identify local barriers to implementation. The TRIP framework
incorporates the expectation that additional intervention, including
changes in policy, may be needed to overcome these barriers. A compo-
nent of this examination might be to take a positive deviance approach,
and study those local providers who actually do disclose to identify the
situational, personal, and organizational factors that support this
behaviour. These effective providers could serve as coaches as well as
supporters of the local efforts. 
Another foundational step in the TRIP framework is to obtain base-
line measurements of performance, in terms of policies and structures
that are in place and awareness by provider and patients of those struc-
tures; provider attitudes (e.g., using safety attitude surveys); actual
performance including conducting disclosure (e.g., using actual testing
or certification of satisfactory completion of training), and outcomes
such as patient and provider satisfaction with the actual discussions.
These measures should be put in place at every level of the health care
system. Assuring that all known adverse events, including those from
errors are disclosed successfully would require increased engagement
of health care leaders and workers to reinforce motivation and to
change the local culture and norms. Health care workers at all levels of
the local system need to be educated about the appropriate handling of
adverse events, and the selected elements of the program need to be
implemented, followed finally by evaluation of the results.
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no
n c
om
me
rci
al 
us
e o
ly
Conclusions
Thought leaders in both the US and Canada have explored the issue
of disclosing adverse events to patients, and there has been a tentative
start toward open disclosure in both countries. In some ways, Canada
has fewer hurdles to successful implementation. It has a single major
medico-legal defence organization for physicians, much more compre-
hensive health care for those injured, and a significantly less litigious
society. In the US there is an array of litigation defence companies with
different philosophies on whether disclosure should even occur. The
lack of universal health coverage means that when one is injured, con-
tinuing and on-going expenses may be a significant driver in the deci-
sion to sue. Nevertheless both countries have supported the policy goal
of full disclosure with laws, legal mandates, and training and support of
physicians and other health professionals who do disclose errors.
There is little literature in Canada about how often disclosure occurs,
but in the US it is evident that it is not occurring uniformly. And even
when it does occur it may still be done in an incomplete or problemat-
ic fashion. We feel that a comprehensive, system wide approach is
needed, with legal, health system and local institutional support. At the
local level, implementation will require formation of teams, training,
measurement, and identification of local barriers to achieve the ulti-
mate goal of universal disclosure of adverse events.
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